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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study is to prove that there was herding behavior by domestic investors following that of foreign 
investors in the Indonesian Capital Market (IDX) and that the herding was influenced by information asymmetry. It 
began when global investors undertook international diversification to the IDX because the returns on their 
portfolios were not on the efficient frontier during the crisis and because of the low correlation between Indonesia’s 
economy and the American and European economies. Utilizing the IDX daily transaction data during the years 
2009-2011, the herding behavior of domestic investors, which followed that of foreign investors, was tested by 
Lakonishok models as was the influence of information asymmetry on the herding. It was found that the herding 
behavior in the IDX occurred in buy, sell or entire herdings (buy and sell). There were 0.40 to 0.55 buy herdings 
and 0.20 to 0.40 sell herdings during the crisis in 2008 and 2009. Buy herding then continued in 2010 onwards, 
although with lower intensity (0.05 to 0.20); however, sell herding decreased dramatically, and there has been 
almost no sell herding since then. Nevertheless, domestic investors did then sell in the opposite strategy, which was 
to sell when foreign investors tended to buy. Subsequent findings demonstrated that herding occurred with the 
influence of information asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he global crisis began in 2008, and the liberalization of financial markets since the 1990s prompted 
global investors to look for alternative investments in emerging countries that were less affected by 
the crisis. Indonesia, as an emerging country, was an alternative investment destination country of the 
international diversification. Indonesia is significant to global investors because of the advantage in the form of its 
low correlation with the American and the European economies. At the time of the economic crisis in America and 
Europe, the economies in emerging countries, particularly Indonesia, were not affected. This, then, caused Indonesia 
and the Indonesian Capital Market (IDX) to gain an economic benefit from the crisis and the impact of financial 
market openness. Financial liberalization, then, caused the IDX to benefit from the increased flow of funds from 
global investors, which in turn raised the Jakarta Composite Index (JCI). The JCI increase, among the highest in the 
world since 2006, would attract foreign investors to continue to diversify internationally in the capital market of 
Indonesia (IDX).  
 
Foreign investors were believed to have large capital funds, more knowledge, abilities, and mastery of information; 
this then often turned out to be a reference for domestic investors in targeting their investment to the leading stocks 
in the LQ 45 on the Stock Exchange for the past 5 years (Dvorak, 2005, and Aggarwal, et al., 2009). Then, 
Panggabean (2006) and Setiyono (2012) found there was herding behavior in the IDX, in which domestic investors 
mimicked the action of foreign investors’ trading strategy. Generally, domestic investors conducted herding based 
on foreign investors trading strategy by following the transactions of purchases and sales of shares of the foreign 
T 
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investors. The importance of herding then led many researchers to search for the determinants of herding, 
particularly the herding of domestic investors following that of the foreign investors. The financial literature 
highlights that the main determinant of herding is information asymmetry as a result of the impact of reputation 
[Dvorak (2005)] and transaction costs [Chiang, et al. (2011)]. Domestic investors in the IDX have always been 
considered inferior to foreign investors, so herding was bound to happen. We will highlight the transaction costs 
argued by Chiang et al. (2011) because of the impact of reputation arguments.  
 
In Chiang et al. (2011), herding will only occur when stocks are traded with high liquidity. Strong flows of trade 
orders that are triggered by low transaction costs will increase the herding behavior of domestic investors. 
Transaction costs, argued by Chiang et al. (2011), were confirmed by the results of previous studies, which found 
herding after the next transaction and followed the pattern of previous transactions. The basis for the herding of 
Chiang et al. (2011) is oriented more to lower transaction costs for domestic investors than to the reputation concern. 
It is more reasonable than Dvorak (2005), in which the effects of the reputation supported herding, but it is the 
transaction fee of Chiang et al. (2011) that is closer to the information asymmetry. 
 
It is not yet conclusive whether the information asymmetry will be a determinant factor of herding. Al Shboul 
(2012) found in Australia that the market capitalization and return growth was up to 51%, not only because of the 
information asymmetry of the domestic investors but also because of their sophistication in the market as global 
investors. However, there were some different conditions in Australia compared with Indonesia. Domestic investors 
in Indonesia are more information asymmetric than Australians. This was why domestic investors in Indonesia herd 
to the foreign investors, while Australians do not. Domestic investors in Australia can play the global investors’ role 
to internationally diversify in the IDX. Despite the global and European crises, geographical proximity between 
Indonesia and Australia would still be attractive for global investors to increase investing in the IDX as an 
alternative. 
 
Herding behavior of information asymmetry is one of the most powerful forms of aberration theory of EMH 
(Efficient Market Hypothesis) of Professor Eugene Fama. The EMH assumes that investors will generally be 
rational in expecting the price of the stock market to come to reflect all market information. However, in the real 
world, rationality is not the case because many investors who get abnormal returns trigger other investors to do the 
same. The actions of the investors are able to indicate their herding behavior in the capital market. Herding behavior 
occurs when investors decide to emulate the decisions of others in the capital markets rather than follow their own 
beliefs as well as information in their possession. Such behavior can be seen as rational for a number of reasons, 
although it may not always lead to efficient market outcomes. Herding can be in the realm of rational utility 
maximizing, for example, if the other participants in the market are expected to have better information or lack 
information asymmetry [Hwang and Salmon (2004)]. Herding behavior is shown by the special characteristics of the 
investor, and it is not only sophisticated investors can also conduct herding. Iihara et al. (2001) describes more 
professional investors herding than amateur investors. Thus, the results of their studies support Chiang et al. (2011) 
that herding and information asymmetry are interconnected (having causality). 
 
Herding also depends on the size and the systematic risk of the company, but no herding was conducted by 
professional investors who are less sensitive to these variables. In addition, herding conducted by both amateur and 
professional investors is positively correlated with and significant to the volatility of stock market returns. Herding 
conducted by amateur investors would cause market volatility. The increase in volatility caused by the information 
asymmetry of the stock price dynamics is employed by amateur investors to not lose from professional investors 
[Franke and Westerhoff (2011)]. Financial markets are known to be characterized by a number of facts relating to 
matters with and or without preconditions in a time series order. It turns out that the price volatility in the capital 
markets often occurred differently from the fundamental factors underlying them. Then, widely agreed upon in the 
literature is the difficult to explain Efficient Market Hypotheses (EMH). The literature explains that the interaction 
between actors of diverse and various investors (heterogeneity) in the capital market with limited rationality 
supports the price volatility that occurs in the capital market. The investors have different information about the 
growth level of performance and of dividend of the issuers in the future so that they have different expectations of 
the value of the company. It is investors’ rationality utilizing information regarding the stock prices, dividends, and 
historical performance in the future that maximizes expected utility. 
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Wang (2000) and Aggarwal et al. (2009) found a size or a proxy of information asymmetry, that is, the difference in 
bid and ask prices in the stock market that determines the highest and lowest prices of everyday transactions. The 
existence of investors who have less or no information because they do not do the research would increase the risk 
premium. Particularly when there are supply shocks in the turmoil situation, the asymmetry of information will 
increase the risk premium, while supply shocks do not increase the risk premium in the situation when there is 
information asymmetry. Information asymmetry among investors also may increase the volatility of stock prices and 
returns with negative autocorrelation. The uninformed investors will behave as rationally as price hunters. They will 
follow the herding of investors who have performed the research to gain better information about the company. 
 
Hwang and Salmon (2004) stated that herding behavior occurs particularly when the market is relatively quieter than 
in stressful times, and herding occurs because of shared values, particularly after an economic crisis. Herding 
behavior was influenced by the financial crisis, the quite large stock trading volume, and the decisions of foreign 
investors [see Al Shboul (2012) in his study of Australia]. They said that herding occurs in the stocks of large issuers 
because it is the stocks of large issuers that are researched by mutual fund investors. Performing research requires a 
considerable cost, which usually can only be paid by large listed companies. Generally, small fund investors do not 
conduct research because it requires huge costs, so they generally do not have information or only have insufficient 
information. Therefore, investors or portfolio managers who have information for conducting research will utilize 
the information to select a portfolio of stocks that is expected to provide a sizeable return because it is below its 
fundamental price. The portfolio manager will be able to maintain a high return because he has more information 
and the stock portfolio is not disclosed. The SEC in the United States requires disclosure of stock mutual fund 
portfolios every quarter (May 2004; previously every six months); this makes it easier for investors with small 
funds, as they will select a mutual fund with big funds so they can follow the herding behavior. 
 
In the Indonesian capital market (IDX), herding occurs by domestic investors to foreign investors, and the stock 
price volatility is affected by the effect of the herding. [Setyawan and Ramli (2013)]. The implication is that the 
more information the foreign investors and the fund managers have, the greater they control the capital market. 
Excess stock price volatility then becomes the deciding factor for high returns. This triggers the hot money in 
foreign funds related to the interest spread of the banking sector. 
 
Thus, it is important to investigate herding behavior in the IDX because of its potential impact on the fluctuating 
returns in the capital market, while according to Kremer and Nautz (2013), the intensity of the herding behavior 
depends on the characteristics of stocks including returns and its volatility in the past. The instability of herding has 
an impact on stock prices in the short term, mostly unplanned. It is done in part to avoid risk. Fernandez (2010) 
suggests herding on individual stocks occurs when the market weakens, and there is an inverse relationship between 
volatility and trading volumes, particularly in cases of the stocks with extreme returns. Most of the previous research 
on herding focused only on the existence and extent of the herding behavior of investors, and to date, there is less 
empirical evidence on the determinants of institutional herding behavior in emerging markets. The information 
asymmetry as a determinant of herding is still not consistent, so it is still necessary to study evidence in the 
Indonesian capital market (IDX). Understanding the determinants of institutional herding could provide better 
solutions to reduce market volatility stemming from the irrational herding behavior. 
 
In addition, previous studies that primarily examined herding behavior among institutional investors relied on 
monthly or quarterly data, and because in the growing capitalization shares on the Stock Exchange there was often 
short-term speculation (daily data) on particular individual stocks, it is necessary to perform better herding 
observations utilizing short-term daily transaction data of each share. The study will be conducted employing each 
stock’s daily transaction to see the herding behavior and whether information asymmetry becomes a determinant of 
the herding in the period of the crisis (years 2009-2011). Determinants of herding in the literature are the liquidity of 
the stock, stock price volatility and stock returns of the past, which are mostly derived from information asymmetry. 
Measurements are conducted employing the herding measure of Lakonishok et al. (1992). The sizes are 0-1; 1 
characterizes herding, and 0 otherwise. Information asymmetry is measured by the ratio of the difference between 
the high and low prices of Aldea and Marin (2007), in which the greater is the ratio, the higher is the information 
asymmetry. 
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The study is intended to answer two research questions: 1) was there a herding behavior of domestic investors to 
foreign investors during the crisis (2009 - 2011) utilizing daily stock transactions on the Indonesian Stock Exchange 
(IDX) 2) Did the information asymmetry affect the intensity of herding behavior during the crisis (2009 -2011) 
utilizing daily stock transactions on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX). 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Herding Concept 
 
Herding is defined as the behavior of investors who follow the behavior of other investors during a certain period; 
the investors put aside their own opinions of what to believe and follow the behavior of other investors [Davenow 
and Welch (2004)]. An important implication of the formation of herding is that actors tend to rely on consensus 
opinion and not on the past trading price of the underlying asset. As a result, according to Fernandez (2010), herding 
could exacerbate asset return volatility and destabilize financial markets, particularly under the stress conditions 
(turmoil). 
 
From the theoretical point of view, the existence of herding can be rationalized in the context of the information 
advantage enjoyed by some investors and information externalities, which can affect the capital structure, research 
and development or merger decisions, panic in the industry [Devenow and Welch (2004)], the signal by investor 
institutions, anxiety experienced by investors due to conflicting opinions (contradiction) and the incentive to hide 
the inability by mimicking the decision making of more able managers. This is reasonable due to the pressure of 
having the best-expected results from the shareholders. 
 
The theoretical literature mostly conceptualized herding behavior as a behavior that is characterized by the actions 
of individuals collectively buying and selling by following (trailing) a particular factor (performance) or style 
(market portfolio), certain sectors, styles, or macroeconomic signals [Al Shboul (2012)]. Consequently, herding is 
identified by utilizing the information contained at the movement of stock prices in cross-sections. Hwang and 
Salmon (2004) argued herding would be stronger in the extreme market conditions compared to the stress capital 
market situation due to potential of decreasing the cross-sectional standard deviation of return. 
 
2.2 The Existence of Herding Hypotheses  
 
Henker et al. (2006) examined whether herding in the broad market sector and industry occurs every day and 
intraday in the Australian equity market. Employing 160 of the most actively traded stocks on the Australian Stock 
Exchange for the period 2001-2002, they did not find any intraday sector herding behavior either in the entirety or in 
industrial markets. However, herding that occurs intraday just occurs to a particular company stock. The difficulty in 
distinguishing herding in normal market circumstances and the extreme market conditions led the researchers then to 
distinguish the actual herding concept from the two following concepts: rational and irrational herding. The concept 
suggests that investors adopt rational investment decisions of other investors to protect their own interests 
[Bickchandani et al. (1992) and Davenow and Welsh (2004)]. Irrational herding occurs when investors blindly copy 
other decisions despite having their own information [Nofsinger and Sias (1999) and Sias (2004)]. In addition to the 
rational and irrational, according Davenow and Welsch (2004), there is still a semi-rational herding concept, where 
an investor will be based on heuristics in decision-making of other investors, combined with their own information. 
The motive of the heuristics is for the sake of long-term yield maximization. 
 
Lakonishok et al. (1992) developed it specifically to detect the size of herding among pension fund managers. They 
analyzed the correlation of trading patterns among a group of investors to buy or sell a particular asset in the same 
time period, and they found that there was no convergence of trade between pension fund managers. Research 
demonstrates that many who apply the size of Lakonishok et al. (1992) reported this, and there is strong evidence of 
herding through the correlation between stock returns and trading volumes [Hiemstra and Jones (1994) and Wei et 
al. (2009)]. However, to capture the differences in the behavior of traders, a group of researchers found weak 
evidence of the existence of herding through the correlation between individual and aggregate stock returns and 
trading volumes [See Alemanni and Onelas (2009)]. 
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Another study investigating the group herding behavior among foreign investors in emerging markets reported no 
evidence of herding [Chen (2001), Koutmos and Saidi (2002) and Park and Sabourian (2011)]. Although these 
studies have made enough contributions to the literature, there will still be discussions about different herding 
measurements (as a correlation pattern among group of investors to buy and sell a particular asset) between 
developed and developing countries. They have discussed differences in the magnitude of herding between 
developed and developing countries, and many other studies still indicate there is herding in the market. 
 
Chang et al. (2000) analyzed the markets in the US, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, and they did not 
find evidence of herding in the US and Hong Kong, but there was only some evidence for Japan. However, Chang et 
al. (2000) reported significant herding evidence in emerging markets, such as South Korea and Taiwan. Choe et al. 
(1998) studied the Korean currency crisis period in 1997 and found foreign investors were more likely to herd than 
domestic investors. Empirical evidence for the case of IDX herding has been discovered by Gunawan et al. (2011), 
Setiyono (2012) and Setyawan and Ramli (2013). Based on the previous description, an alternative hypothesis as 
follows could be proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 1. In the daily stock transactions in the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX), there was herding behavior by 
domestic investors following that by foreign investors during the crisis (2009-2011). 
 
2.3 Hypotheses of the Herding Determinants  
 
Herding intensity is negatively related to the size of the market, which indicates that institutional herding in the 
Taiwan stock market is primarily driven by information asymmetry [see Zhou and Lai (2009)]. The size of the 
market in Taiwan will be perceived differently by investors. Chamley (2004) suggested that the problem of 
information asymmetry in the capital market can explain the volatility of the stock price. Imperfectly informed 
investors in the capital markets may cause the stock price to be more volatile than the capital market of perfectly 
informed investors. There are two factors that contribute to the change in stock price: changing expectations of 
future cash flow and a lack of information. Usually stocks that have less information are small in capitalization 
compared to the large stakes. Small stocks are generally less researched by capital market researchers compared to 
the large stakes. This is due to the relatively high cost of research. Conducting research for large stocks are expected 
to provide greater profits, considering their trading stocks will be more liquid than those of small stocks. 
 
The liquid or illiquid stock situation discussed in the literature mainly tested the impact on the stock returns [Lee and 
Rui (2002) and Li and Wang (2010)]. Assets that react strongly to changes in the overall market liquidity crisis 
make the illiquidity to cause investors’ expected returns to be higher, and investors tend to require systematic 
liquidity premiums [Campbell, et al. (2009)]. Other research that focuses on the direct impact of illiquidity on stock 
prices is Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Amihud (2002). Amihud and Mendelson (1986) argued that the spread 
(the difference between the stock prices) is a liquidity-based transaction cost for traders. When liquidity increases, 
transaction costs (spread) decrease. Consequently, the share price will rise. However, illiquidity will reduce 
investors’ interest due to the reduced attractiveness of the stock. When illiquidity occurs, corporate issuers will 
perform various actions to raise the liquidity of their shares in more ways than discounting the price. 
 
Amihud (2002) established the relationship between illiquidity and stock prices. He found illiquidity decreases the 
share price on the basis of an increase in price volatility. During volatility, the asset liquidity premium increases. As 
a result, the stock becomes more risky. Amihud (2002) used a general equilibrium model to connect the liquidity of 
the stock market and its impact on asset prices. Amihud (2002) found that the trade in the stock market will be liquid 
(increased in liquidity) when trading has a complete match between the seller and the buyer. Lou and Shu (2014) 
found that in China's stock market, the illiquidity factor is derived from information asymmetry. Kremer and Nautz 
(2013) found that the herding intensity depends on the characteristics of the stock, including stock liquidity, as well 
as on historical stock returns and volatility of stock prices (unintentional herding). However, in contrast to the 
intentional herding theory, herding is more inclined to the more liquid and larger shares. Herding intensity depends 
on the volatility of the past within the asymmetric information situation. The volatility leads to increased sell 
herding and decreased buy herding. 
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When investors are uninformed about the real dividend growth rate, expectations of future cash flows are less 
varied. This has the effect of reducing price volatility. However, it illustrates that there is uncertainty of cash flows 
over these shares in the future. Investors then demand higher premiums to accommodate the information asymmetry, 
and the stock price becomes more sensitive in trade deals. This would increase price volatility. The net changes in 
the volatility of the price (highest and lowest price) depend on factors expectations or information asymmetry that 
has a dominant influence on the stock price. When information asymmetry is considered more important or more 
dominant, then the prices become more volatile as investors are uninformed.  
 
Wang (2000) found that the information asymmetry among investors can lead to increased price volatility. In the 
information asymmetry situation, the investors who have more information will have the advantage over the 
uninformed investors. Therefore, the uninformed investors will face miscast (adverse selection) problems when they 
respond to various types of information, so they will buy the stock at a price higher than the actual price 
(overpriced). They demand an additional premium for the risk they trade off to the investors who have more 
information. This situation makes it more elastic and will increase the price volatility. The existence of uninformed 
investors may cause the risk premiums to become much higher than in the situation of symmetric information (type 
of efficient markets). When many investors are less informed (uninformed investors), the price then is formed on the 
basis of less fundamental information. This will result in the greater uncertainty of future cash flows. Therefore, in 
stock investing, the uninformed investors will require higher premiums. Lou and Shu (2014) stated that as 
uninformed investors increase, the premiums they will assign will increase. In situations where the uninformed 
investors increase, the asymmetry of information will be greater, and the greater the difference between the highest 
and lowest prices (spread). Therefore, investors are increasingly demanding higher premium as compensation. 
 
De Long et al. (1990) suggested that the trade within the information asymmetry in the capital market could increase 
price volatility due to a greater risk premium. Such high expectations of stock returns depend only on the risk of 
stock future cash flows. Furthermore, according to De Long et al. (1990), although the trade within the increased 
price volatility is without information asymmetry, this does not affect the risk premium because it will not change 
the stock fundamental risk. However, if there is information asymmetry in the capital market, the trade will occur 
with different information, and this will affect the quality of the price of the personal information of each investor of 
the expected future cash flows. 
 
Amihud (2002) demonstrated that there was a significant negative correlation sequence of long-term stock returns. 
There was a successive negative correlation between the stock returns and the average of excess return (the 
difference between actual returns and expected returns) that can be derived from a negative average of the 
underlying variables. However, in the presence of information asymmetry, the uninformed investors then can only 
learn from the state variables or from the realized returns (past). The future investors’ expected return will depend 
on the average return in the past, and this will allow generating negative stock returns. Herding is due to the stock's 
liquidity, volatility and past stock returns derived from information asymmetry [see opinions Testa (2012) and 
Bootrz and Kremer (2013)]. 
 
Hypothesis 2: information asymmetry affects the intensity of herding. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODS 
 
3.1 Research Data 
 
Employing daily stock transaction of each share traded, the study was conducted during the crisis period of 2009-
2011. We used the Iq prime plus daily transactions data, such as transactions of each foreign buy and sell stocks, and 
domestic buy and sell stocks with the high and low prices. 
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3.2 Operational Variables 
 
3.2.1 Herding Behavior 
 
Setyawan and Ramli (2013) described herding behavior of investors that follows the decisions taken by other 
investors. Operationally, the herding will be measured by the herding measure of Lakonishok et al. (1992), 
Nofsinger (1996) and Neal et al. (2002). This herding size has a major component of the purchase and sale of shares 
interaction between foreign investors and domestic investors. The code symbol size is according to herding research 
by Lakonishok et al. (1992), Nofsinger (1996) and Neal et al. (2002), and is represented by Hi with the formulation: 
 
Hi = 1/N ∑ ∑ ABS (Bijt/ (Bijt + Sijt) – pit) – AFijt (1) 
 
For the effectiveness of the above Hi value, the data Bijt and Sijt  are required to be present in the database trading. 
Bijt and Sijt are buy and sell transactions between foreign investors and domestic investors. If there is an indication 
of trading between domestic and foreign investors, the potential for domestic investor herding appears. 
 
Component Notes 
Hi herding measure from investor group i 
Bijt number of buy trades from investors group i, in stock j; on day t 
Sijt number of sell trades from investors group i, in stock j, on day t 
Pit the proportion of trades by group i; across all stocks; on day t that are buys (i.e., the average of Bijt/(Bijt+Sijt) 
over j) 
AFijt adjustment factors, i.e., expected value of the absolute value of (Bijt/ (Bijt + Sijt) – pit)) with the assumption that 
Bijt follows a binomial distribution with the probability pit of success. 
 
Based on the formula of herding measure, if the Hi value is higher, it means there is no indication of herding 
behavior. The more positive the Hi is, the bigger the buy herding behavior indication, while if it is more negative, 
there is an indication of herding because of the behavior of the sell. When the value of Hi is close to zero, it means 
there is no indication of herding behavior. For the case when the value of the IDX Pit and AFijt are difficult to 
estimate, it is possible to be equated with zero. Purpose ABS is the absolute value when the results are compared 
with the minus positive results. 
 
Information Asymmetry 
 
“Information asymmetry is present when one party to a transaction has more or better information than the other 
party. (This is also called a state of asymmetric information). Most commonly, information asymmetries are studied 
in the context of principal-agent problems”.  (Aldea and Marin, 2007) 
 
IAjt = [(HTijt – HTejt)/( HTijt + HTejt) 0,5] x 100%   (2) 
 
IAjt  = Information Asymmetry of Transaction on Stock j on day t.  
 
HTi jt = The Highest Price of Transaction on Stock j on day t. 
 
HTe jt = The Lowest Price of Transaction on Stock j on day t. 
 
3.3 Analysis Method 
 
3.3.1 Herding Existence Model of Hypothesis Testing 
 
To test the potential of herding in the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX), in addition to using the amount of herding 
as size in B.1, we will use descriptive chart patterns. Using the dummy variable of the amount of herding, which is 
measured by 1, and 0 otherwise, it was proven that the existence of herding is one point only (discrete). The pattern 
in the chart shows the continuity of herding that occurs in the IDX. We consider the continuity of herding to be as 
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important as the dynamics of the herding patterns, in terms of them being stationary or fluctuating. When the 
movement indicates stationary herding, there is an indication of information asymmetry as a determinant of herding, 
or else the fluctuated herding movement signals that there is a stronger effect of information asymmetry. 
 
Frequency chart patterns and sizes were employed by Lakonishok et al. (1992) in a herding study. The indications of 
herding will be proven (H1 will be accepted) when the pattern of the frequency and size of herding by Lakonishok et 
al. (1992) are not too stationary, and they will be characterized by a certain trend. The total (H), buy (Hb) and sell 
(Hs) herding were tested. 
 
3.3.2 Herding Determinants Model of Hypothesis Testing 
 
For this hypothesis testing, we will be using analysis of VAR or VEC. VAR analysis is used when herding 
relationship patterns and information asymmetry are linear, while the VEC analysis is used when the relationship 
between the two is non-linear. The terms of VAR or VEC analysis is the existence of a causal relationship between 
herding and information asymmetry with a Granger Causality test. 
Technically, a VAR or VEC analysis model of herding and information asymmetry can be described as follows: 
 
Hit = β0 + β1Hi(t-1) +… + βnHi(t-n) + ψ1IAi(t-1) + …..+ ψn IAi(t-n) + ε it (3) 
 
IAit = δ0 + δ1IAi(t-1) + ….δnIAi(t-n) + ω1Hi(t-1) + ….. ω nHi(t-n) + ε it (4) 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) is accepted when β1, … βn, ψ1….. ψn, δ1, … δn and ω1, … ωn  have a significant influence on H 
and IA. [p-value ≤ 0.05]. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Identification of Herding During 2009-2011 
 
Descriptive statistical analysis of the frequency herding behavior (Freq_herding), either buy or sell, demonstrates 
that the average buy herding is larger than sell herding. Likewise, the median is greater for freq. herding to buy than 
freq. herding to sell. This suggests that more domestic investors conduct herding when they buy shares. While there 
is herding of domestic investors to the foreign investors in the context of the sale of shares, or freq. herding to sell, 
domestic investors do not always conduct herding. Looking at the not supportive economic situation (not good), 
then domestic investors tend to conduct a good buy or sell herding. This happened in 2009. However, when the 
economy started to recover in the first quarter of 2010 to 2011, domestic investors tended to conduct buy herding 
rather than sell herding. Maximum Freq. herding to buy is at 0.275168, while the result for the maximum freq. 
herding to sell is 0.323077 (see table 4.1). 
 
This suggests that when the current economic situation is volatile, the panicked domestic investors follow the 
trading transactions undertaken by foreign investors, either sale or purchase of shares, even when freq. herding to 
sell exceeds freq. herding to buy. This is supported by the smaller standard deviation of freq. herding to buy than the 
standard deviation of freq. herding to sell. The domestic investors respond better to a volatile economic situation and 
become more panicked by selling shares compared to buying stocks by following foreign investors who sell their 
shares. Frequency of herding against foreign investors buying has a smaller deviation than the frequency deviation 
of sell herding. Domestic investors are more convinced by the foreign investors in purchasing stocks, so they are 
more stable following the purchase of shares bought by foreign investors. When selling stocks in the normal or not 
volatile economic situation, domestic investors do not get hung up on the sale of the shares by foreign investors, but 
rather on the stock return. Except in a turbulent economic situation, they tend to follow the behavior of foreign 
investors selling shares. 
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Table 4.1. Freq. herding to buy and Freq. herding to sell in 2009 – 2011 
Component Freq. Herding To Buy Freq. Herding To Sell 
Mean 0.141794 0.093766 
Median 0.123529 0.019231 
Maximum 0.275168 0.323077 
Minimum 0.000000 0.000000 
Std. Dev. 0.053798 0.103082 
Skewness 0.255314 0.568319 
Kurtosis 2.267630 1.535438 
Jarque-Bera 14.77969 63.58243 
Probability 0.000617 0.000000 
Sum 63.09835 41.63214 
Sum Sq. Dev. 1.285057 4.707241 
Observations 445 444 
 
Figure 4.1 provides a more detailed picture of the freq. herding to sell; in 2009, there was a fairly large freq. herding 
to sell, even exceeding freq. herding to buy. This reinforces the view that in the current economic turmoil, domestic 
investors tend to follow the trading behavior of foreign investors in buying and selling shares, particularly in selling 
shares. While in a normal or stable economic situation, the domestic investors do not really follow sell herding 
because they believe that in the sale of shares, they will follow the pattern of returns in accordance with their desired 
return. 
 
When the economic situation is in a normal state, freq. herding to buy is declining but still larger than freq. herding 
to sell (Figure 5.2., 5.3.). After 2009, the economic situation in Indonesia tended to be stable and even increasing, so 
freq. herding to buy continues although the intensity decreases. However, freq. herding to sell is down dramatically 
and occurs only in small to zero frequency. 
 
Figure 4.1. Freq. Herding to Sell in 2009 - 2011 
 
 
The buy herding by domestic investors following foreign investors in emerging markets indicates that domestic 
investors still lack confidence in the results of the analysis of their own work, and the domestic investors’ number of 
transactions is much smaller than the foreign investors’ transactions conducted. Therefore, they prefer to follow the 
purchase transaction of foreign investors. In addition, market analysis knowledge of domestic investors on the price 
of a share is far less than that of the foreign investors. It makes it much safer for them to follow the purchase 
transaction of foreign investors who are believed to have more expertise than domestic investors. 
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The data types of stocks with zero or no herding have a large enough frequency or greater per week compared with 
the average data of the stocks that have a herding transactions by domestic investors, and it usually occurs in the 
second or third tier stocks, which are less attractive to foreign investors. This suggests that the majority of domestic 
investors tend to invest in stocks that are not traded by foreign investors, with a small total volume transaction. The 
price of the stock is not influenced by foreign investors. Domestic investors traded the stocks with each other in 
stocks that are outside of the seed stocks or outside the 45 blue chip stocks. The portfolio developed by the domestic 
investors are more in stocks other than the LQ 45 index stocks, so the information asymmetry among domestic 
investors was allegedly not large enough. Because the supply and demand of shares involve domestic investors’ lack 
of knowledge or lack of information, the information asymmetry is not large enough, except in the case of insider 
trading. Insider trading is alleged by the large enough volume of transactions that is above the average transactions 
volume during the period (per week), although there is no information that could lead to an increase in the amount of 
the transaction. 
 
Figure 4.2. Freq. Herding to Buy in 2009 - 2011 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Freq. Herding to Buy and Freq. Herding to Sell in 2009 - 2011 
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4.2 Herding Identification During 2009-2011  
 
During 2009 (the unit data of 100-300), the total herding (H) chart did not fluctuate too much at the beginning and 
then declined in the second quarter following. It was between .40 and .50. The buy herding (Hb) and sell herding 
(Hs) were similar and did not fluctuate too much either; it was between .20 and .30. A different case is in the second 
quarter following; the buy herding dropped to .10 - .15, and the sell herding to .00 - .02. After the second quarter of 
2009, there was still buy herding (Hb) with smaller frequency, but it was not with the sell herding. There was not 
sell herding since. For the years 2010-2011 (the unit data 300-700), there was buy herding, but it was not with the 
sell herding. This indicates that during the crisis (beginning of 2009), larger herding occurred in the IDX, and it still 
continued afterwards but with a smaller frequency. The buy and sell herding occurred during the crisis, but there 
was only buy herding afterwards. Domestic investors are more inclined to conduct buy herding.  
 
Figure 5.4. Herding (H, Hb and HS) in 2009 – 2011 
 
 
 
Table 5.2 Normality of Herding (H, Hb and Hs) in 2009 – 2011 with Proxy from Lakonishok, et. al. (1992) 
Component H Hb Hs 
Mean 0.185524 0.130625 0.054899 
Median 0.138122 0.122222 0.017442 
Std. Dev. 0.122408 0.047988 0.083068 
Jarque-Bera 231.5994 15.71057 354.9736 
Probability 0.000000 0.000388 0.000000 
 
4.3 Identification Information of Asymmetry During 2009-2011 Utilizing The Size of Aldea and Marin (2007) 
 
In Figure 5.5, the visible range of the value of information asymmetry is 0.005 to 0.015. It indicates that the 
information asymmetry is not fluctuating too much. There was an indication that the domestic investors had 
difficulty in obtaining additional information in deciding trading strategies. However, the rather stable value of 
information asymmetry implicates high liquidity in stock exchange trading among domestic investors. The high 
liquidity of the stock exchange will have a positive impact on the performance of the Jakarta Composite Index (JCI), 
which is expected to lead to special attraction for foreign investors. The resulting implications include that the high 
information asymmetry could improve herding behavior between foreign and domestic investors on the stock 
exchange. 
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Figure 5.5. Information Asymmetry in 2009 – 2011 with proxy from Aldea and Marin (2007) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6. The visible evidence of normality for information asymmetry is shown in the histogram pattern above, 
i.e., the value of the Jarque-Berra is very high, and the amount of information asymmetry exceeds the average value 
of the standard deviation. The normality of information asymmetry will support stationary patterns when tested with 
herding. 
 
Figure 5.6. Test of Normality from Information Asymmetry in 2009 – 2011 with proxy from Aldea and Marin (2007) 
 
 
 
4.4 Granger Causality and the VEC Model 
 
4.4.1 Granger Causality Analysis on the 4th Lag 
 
The Granger causality analysis is effective on the 4th lag. Reciprocal relationships were found between total herding 
and buy herding, total herding and information asymmetry, and sell herding and information asymmetry. Reciprocal 
relationships between total herding and buy herding, total herding and information asymmetry, and sell herding and 
information asymmetry indicate that the three relationships can be estimated by the VAR or VEC model. The VAR 
model could be employed if a reciprocal relationship is linear, whereas if the reciprocal relationship between these 
three models is nonlinear, the VEC model would be more relevant.  
 
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
100 200 300 400 500 600 700
IA
0
50
100
150
200
0.000 0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020
Series:  IA
Sample  1  735
Observations  735
Mean           0.004332
Median     0.003626
Maximum     0.023791
Minimum     0.000000
Std.  Dev.       0.002652
Skewness       2.254088
Kurtosis       10.90092
Jarque-­Bera   2534.162
Probability   0.000000
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2016 Volume 32, Number 1 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 281 The Clute Institute 
The cause of the non-linear nature of the relationship among herding and various determinants is the herding 
measure, which is the ratio of the number of purchases and sales of stocks of foreign and domestic investors. The 
herding amount obtained of 0-1, cannot be in the form of a straight diagonal line of data distribution when mapped 
in P-Plot, which is usually used as normality check. 
 
4.5 VEC Model 
 
4.5.1 Total Herding and Buy Herding  
 
The value co-integration equation of the buy herding significant t-test indicates the existence of a long-term 
equilibrium relationship between total herding and buy herding. Most of the long-term period shares to buy 
transactions on the stock exchange have been turned out by the foreign investors. The actions of the foreign 
investors to buy shares in a period will be followed by the domestic investors. 
 
The VEC regression model results found that there is significant influence of herding in the past compared with 
herding now. This supports the theory of technical analysis stock: history repeats itself. In the transactions of 
purchases and sales of shares on the stock exchange, foreign investors will look at historical performances. In 
addition, there is also a significant effect of buy herding in the past on the current herding. The historical 
performance of all transactions will be important information for foreign investors; this then is followed by the 
domestic investors. 
 
4.5.2 Total Herding and Information Asymmetry  
 
In this section, it is found that there is a visible long-term relationship (co-integration) between total herding and 
information asymmetry. The existence of co-integration between herding and information asymmetry indicates that 
the action of purchases and sales of shares of foreign investors is followed by the domestic investors. This also 
results in increasing price volatility as a result of a wide range of stock prices in the order book. 
 
Related to the VEC model regression results, herding behavior is influenced by information asymmetry. However, 
information asymmetry will not be influenced by herding behavior. The information asymmetry is influenced by the 
information asymmetry of the two and three previous periods. This finding indicates that the domestic investors 
followed the action of the foreign investors due to the lack of information. This is caused by the differences in 
access to the latest information and most comprehensive data between foreign investors and domestic investors that 
are still imposed in the IDX. 
 
4.5.3 Sell Herding and Information Asymmetry  
 
The VEC model analysis between sell herding and information asymmetry found that sell herding and information 
asymmetry had a co-integration. The co-integration between the two is the act of the sale of shares of foreign 
investors, followed by the domestic investors. The co-integration is more due to the information asymmetry. In the 
long term, when the price volatility is increasing on the stock exchange, this will be encouraged by domestic 
investors who conduct panic selling. 
 
The information asymmetry shown affects the sell herding during 1, 2 and 3 periods previous. However, as an 
endogenous variable, the sell herding as exogenous in VEC does not have a significant effect on information 
asymmetry. The information asymmetry is only affected by the information asymmetry itself from the previous 
period. These findings suggest that the information asymmetry the domestic investors suffer could potentially lead 
to panic selling when they do not have enough confidence in and experience with a share. 
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4.6 Results Discussion 
 
Hypothesis 1: Testing (Existence of Herding) 
 
The existence of herding in the study can be proved by the results of herding frequency movements during 2009-
2011. The frequency of buy herding and sell herding movement is shown in the results of different graphs. Sell 
herding frequency movement was the dominant frequency in the period 2009-2010 and less dominant in the period 
2010-2011. Different things occurred to produce a consistent buy herding movement that was dominant in the period 
2009-2011. The dynamic movement of buy and sell herding confirms the existence of herding in the IDX and 
automatically receives H1. 
 
Employing the amount of the existence of herding of Lakonishok et al. (1992), it is found that there was also a 
dynamic movement of buy herding and sell herding during the period 2009-2011. The dynamic buy herding 
movement appears more dominant than sell herding. The magnitude of sell herding has a range of 0.05 to 0.10, 
smaller than buy herding, which has the range of 0.20 to 0.30. The results also indicate that domestic investors are 
more inclined to conduct buy herding than sell herding. Evidence of the existence of herding in the IDX supports the 
studies by Neal et al. (2002), Bowe and Domuta (2004), Gunawan et al. (2011), Setiyono (2012) and Setyawan and 
Ramli (2013). 
 
Hypothesis 2: Testing (Determinants of Herding) 
 
At the time of the analysis of the dynamic movement of information asymmetry with the graphical analysis, the 
results demonstrated that a movement pattern is not as dynamic as herding. When we utilize the scatter plot analysis 
(distribution of data) with a concern for herding and information asymmetry, a quadratic pattern is detected with the 
characteristic of information asymmetry forming a parabolic curve with a maximum value of 0.20. 
 
When regression was performed to test hypothesis 2, the VEC (Vector Error Correction) model was then 
implemented, which preceded the Granger causality analysis; it was proved significant in the 4th lag. The VEC 
analysis results prove the existence of herding influenced by information asymmetry, and more surprising, changes 
in the IDX information asymmetry will lead to sell herding. These results support the study and confirm H2, Testa 
(2012) and Brootz and Kremer (2013). 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
 
There are two objectives in this study: 1) Confirming the existence of herding in the IDX and 2) Confirming whether 
information asymmetry could be a determinant of herding. The results demonstrated that herding behavior still 
occurs on the stock exchange, but of a different pattern from the previous studies by Gunawan et al. (2011), 
Setiyono (2012) and Setyawan and Ramli (2013). We split herding into buy herding and sell herding. The purpose 
of this herding solution is to see whether there is a donation effect of information asymmetry in accordance with 
Testa (2012) and Brootz and Kremer (2013). 
 
When analyzing the dynamic movement of buy herding and sell herding frequency utilizing the amount of herding 
of Lakonishok et al. (1992), the second type of herding presents the dynamic movement patterns that prove the 
existence of herding continuously during the period 2009-2011 that remained since the crisis. These results extend 
the existence of discrete herding occurring in earlier studies. 
 
The second objective of this study was also successfully demonstrated by the effect of information asymmetry, in 
particular, on sell herding. This result is unique to the case of the stock exchange because it means the phenomenon 
of panic selling that occurs is caused by herding and information asymmetry in accordance with the opinions of 
Testa (2012). Domestic investors who are exposed to information asymmetry tend not to disagree with foreign 
investors’ trading position but instead always support them. 
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5.2 Suggestions 
 
This research still needs to be improved in terms of the measurement of buy herding and sell herding because it 
employs only the negative indication of the proxy of herding by Lakonishok et al. (1992), which leads to sell 
herding, and a positive indication for buy herding. Another important aspect to improve is to reconstruct the proxy 
of information asymmetry of Aldea and Marin (2007) from daily data into the intraday level. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
  HB does not Granger Cause H 731 11.2304 7.6E-09 
  H does not Granger Cause HB  13.7490 8.2E-11 
  HS does not Granger Cause H 731 11.2304 7.6E-09 
  H does not Granger Cause HS  0.59546 0.66603 
  IA does not Granger Cause H 731 3.29053 0.01098 
  H does not Granger Cause IA  2.55494 0.03778 
  HS does not Granger Cause HB 731 13.7490 8.2E-11 
  HB does not Granger Cause HS  0.59546 0.66603 
  IA does not Granger Cause HB 731 1.80201 0.12657 
  HB does not Granger Cause IA  2.79296 0.02545 
  IA does not Granger Cause HS 731 3.07651 0.01579 
  HS does not Granger Cause IA  2.33977 0.05376 
 
 
VEC Model of Total herding and Buy herding 
Error Correction: D(H) D(HB) 
CointEq1 
0.230447 0.222268 
(0.03747) (0.02569) 
(6.14954) (8.65229) 
D(H(-1)) 
-0.538892 -0.059217 
(0.08545) (0.05858) 
(-6.30619) (-1.01086) 
D(H(-2)) 
-0.381836 -0.070385 
(0.09120) (0.06252) 
(-4.18680) (-1.12581) 
D(H(-3)) 
-0.364917 -0.124379 
(0.08955) (0.06139) 
(-4.07487) (-2.02604) 
D(H(-4)) 
-0.316925 -0.164306 
(0.08055) (0.05522) 
(-3.93469) (-2.97572) 
D(HB(-1)) 
0.341833 -0.180090 
(0.15335) (0.10512) 
(2.22911) (-1.71313) 
D(HB(-2)) 
0.233172 -0.098826 
(0.15317) (0.10500) 
(1.52235) (-0.94122) 
D(HB(-3)) 
0.323090 0.088022 
(0.14150) (0.09700) 
(2.28337) (0.90746) 
D(HB(-4)) 
0.359472 0.194395 
(0.11739) (0.08047) 
(3.06215) (2.41563) 
C 
-0.000682 -0.000228 
(0.00185) (0.00127) 
(-0.36775) (-0.17958) 
R-squared 0.289442 0.375356 
Adj. R-squared 0.280560 0.367547 
Akaike Information Criteria -8.599291  
Schwarz Criteria  -8.460870 
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VEC Model of Total Herding and Information Asymmetry 
Errzor Correction: D(H) D(IA) 
CointEq1 
0.002486 0.002061 
(0.00576) (0.00025) 
(0.43192) (8.32205) 
D(H(-1)) 
-0.551717 -0.000224 
(0.03732) (0.00161) 
(-14.7819) (-0.13953) 
D(H(-2)) 
-0.400188 0.000530 
(0.04127) (0.00178) 
(-9.69702) (0.29846) 
D(H(-3)) 
-0.262418 0.000935 
(0.04101) (0.00176) 
(-6.39863) (0.52997) 
D(H(-4)) 
-0.148139 0.001094 
(0.03679) (0.00158) 
(-4.02651) (0.69103) 
D(IA(-1)) 
-1.040831 -0.244567 
(1.11656) (0.04805) 
(-0.93218) (-5.08985) 
D(IA(-2)) 
-2.608741 -0.075645 
(1.07675) (0.04634) 
(-2.42279) (-1.63250) 
D(IA(-3)) 
-2.198762 -0.035876 
(1.01300) (0.04359) 
(-2.17054) (-0.82295) 
D(IA(-4)) 
-0.303504 -0.034578 
(0.86213) (0.03710) 
(-0.35204) (-0.93199) 
C 
-0.000730 -3.46E-06 
(0.00190) (8.2E-05) 
(-0.38415) (-0.04225) 
R-squared 0.252449 0.287775 
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VEC Model of Sell Herding and Information Asymmetry 
Error Correction: D(HS) D(IA) 
CointEq1 
-0.000569 0.002939 
(0.00393) (0.00035) 
(-0.14470) (8.38374) 
D(HS(-1)) 
-0.471031 -0.003662 
(0.03711) (0.00331) 
(-12.6941) (-1.10703) 
D(HS(-2)) 
-0.312762 -0.002827 
(0.03990) (0.00356) 
(-7.83862) (-0.79472) 
D(HS(-3)) 
-0.249787 0.000617 
(0.03976) (0.00354) 
(-6.28167) (0.17396) 
D(HS(-4)) 
-0.145180 0.000117 
(0.03683) (0.00328) 
(-3.94182) (0.03569) 
D(IA(-1)) 
-0.958616 -0.241414 
(0.53784) (0.04795) 
(-1.78236) (-5.03497) 
D(IA(-2)) 
-1.366803 -0.074879 
(0.51937) (0.04630) 
(-2.63166) (-1.61722) 
D(IA(-3)) 
-1.021588 -0.038732 
(0.48941) (0.04363) 
(-2.08739) (-0.88772) 
D(IA(-4)) 
-0.043326 -0.038223 
(0.41661) (0.03714) 
(-0.10400) (-1.02914) 
C 
-0.000469 -5.68E-06 
(0.00092) (8.2E-05) 
(-0.51031) (-0.06941) 
R-squared 0.204056 0.286646 
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